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Abstract
Private security and military companies have become a ubiquitous part of modern
armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Their diverse clients include
governments in the developed and developing world alike, non-state belligerents,
international corporations, non-governmental organizations, the United Nations, and
private individuals. The implications of this proliferation of private security and
military companies for international humanitarian law and human rights are only
beginning to be appreciated, as potential violations and misconduct by their employees
have come to light in Iraq and Afghanistan. The author critically examines the
theoretical risks posed by private military and security company activity with respect
to violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, together with the
incentives that these companies have to comply with those norms. Empirical evidence
is also presented to expand on this theoretical framework. Taking a multidisciplinary
approach, the author draws on law, international relations theory, criminology,
economics, corporate strategy and political economy, as well as psychology and
sociology, to analyse the competing ‘‘risk-factors’’ and ‘‘compliance levers’’ that
interact at each level of private military and security company activity to enhance or
reduce the likelihood of a violation occurring. These findings are then applied by the
author to assess emergent measures to deal with private security and military
companies outside the legal sphere, including a programme of the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the advent of the International Peace Operations
Association.
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Introduction
Private security companies1 and private military companies2 have become a
ubiquitous part of modern armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction.3 The
implications of this proliferation of private military and security company activity
for international humanitarian law4 are only beginning to be realized as potential
violations by their employees come to light.5
Despite a wealth of legal and political science literature on private security
and military companies, no truly systematic analysis has been undertaken to
illuminate the theoretical risks of violations of international humanitarian law by
such companies and the incentives they have to comply with it. The result is an
incomplete picture that fails to adequately appreciate the complex interrelation-
ship between each component of private military and security company activity
and their impact on compliance with international humanitarian law.
Compounding this blind spot in the literature is the limited recourse that has
been had to relevant multidisciplinary tools of analysis and empirical evidence.
Recognizing these concerns, this article sets out to identify and examine
critically examine the competing ‘‘risk factors’’ and ‘‘compliance levers’’ (or
incentives) that interact at each level of private military and security company
1 Private security companies are companies that provide defensive armed protection for premises or
people, capable of defending against guerrilla forces or serving as personal bodyguards. By contrast,
Non-lethal services providers (NSPs) provide logistical support such as de-mining, laundry and food
services. Doug Brooks, ‘‘Protecting people: The PMC potential: Comments and suggestions for the UK
Green Paper on regulating private military services’’, 25 July 2002, pp. 2–3.
2 Private military companies include both ‘‘active PMCs willing to carry weapons into combat, and passive
PMCs that focus on training and organizational issues’’. Ibid.
3 The industry is expected to grow from US$55.6 billion in 1990 to $210 billion by 2010. Paul Keilthy,
‘‘Private security firms in war zones worry NGOs’’, 11 August 2004, online at AlertNet, ,http://
www.alertnet.org/. (visited 23 October 2006).
4 ‘‘[T]he personnel of private military and security companies must respect international humanitarian
law and can be prosecuted if they commit war crimes.’’ See ‘‘The ICRC to expand contacts with private
military and security companies’’, International Committee of the Red Cross, 4 August 2004, online at
,http://www.icrc.org/. (visited 23 October 2006).
5 See, e.g., in Afghanistan, United States v. Passaro, No. 5:04-CR-211-1, 2004 WL 1431014 (E.D.N.C.)
(Central Intelligence Agency contractor charged with two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon
with intent to do bodily harm, and two counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury against a
detainee); Shaista Shameem, ‘‘Report of the Special Rapporteur: Use of mercenaries as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination’’,
Commission on Human Rights, 61st Sess., UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/14, 8 December 2004, p. 14 (three
United States contractors found guilty by an Afghan court in September 2004 for torture, running a
private prison and illegal detention); in Iraq, Major General Taguba, Article 15–6 Investigation of the
800th Military Police Brigade, 2004, online at ,http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.
pdf. (Taguba Report, implicating private military and security company interrogators and translators
in the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib detention facility) (visited 23 October 2006); but see
HC 577 Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation 2001–02, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (United Kingdom), The Stationary Office, London, 12 February 2002, pp. 17, 19 (hereinafter UK,
Options for Regulation) (private military and security companies often respect international
humanitarian law and human rights better than national armies or peacekeeping forces).
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activity to enhance or reduce the likelihood of a violation of international
humanitarian law. The relevant levels of analysis are (i) states of incorporation of
private security and military companies; (ii) states from which personnel of private
security and military companies are recruited; (iii) states in which private security
and military companies actually operate; (iv) clients of private security and
military companies; (v) the private security and military company industry as a
whole; (vi) individual private security and military firms (including their officers
and directors); and (vii) employees of private security and military companies. At
each of these levels, the strongest risk factors and compliance levers are explored
from relevant multidisciplinary perspectives, including law, international
relations, criminology, economics, management and political economy, as well
as psychology and sociology. Empirical evidence is offered to illustrate the
theoretical findings. This research concludes by linking these findings with
emergent approaches outside formal law to promote private military and security
company compliance with international humanitarian law.
The compliance framework: risk factors and compliance levers
International relations scholar Elke Krahmann describes the ‘‘functional
fragmentation’’ of global security away from a state-centric model towards
‘‘multiple and separate authorities, including public or private actors’’.6 Nowhere
is this more apparent than in private military and security company activity, with
its many potential sites of normativity. There are risks that each player will
contribute to an international humanitarian law violation occurring on the
ground, but paradoxically, at the same time they have often powerful incentives
to promote compliance. It is the result of this contest of risks and incentives that
will largely determine whether international humanitarian law is respected.
Deconstructing the main risks and countervailing incentives at play is the aim of
the present analysis.
State of incorporation
Most private security and military companies are incorporated in the United
States, the United Kingdom and South Africa.7 States of incorporation may
contribute to the risk of international humanitarian law violations owing to the
‘‘charter shopping’’ phenomenon, weak extraterritorial regimes and the privileging
of foreign policy interests rather than international humanitarian law concerns.
6 Elke Krahmann, ‘‘The privatization of security governance: Developments, problems, solutions’’, 1/
2003, Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik, p. 6, online at ,http://www.politik.uni-koeln.de/jaeger/
downloads/aipa0103.pdf. (visited 23 October 2006).
7 Carlos Ortiz, ‘‘Regulating private military companies: States and the expanding business of commercial
security provision’’, in Kees van der Pijl et al. (eds.), Global Regulation: Managing Crises after the
Imperial Turn, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 211.
Volume 88 Number 863 September 2006
615
Conversely, it is generally in the reputational and economic interests of these states
to promote compliance with international humanitarian law.
The contribution of states of incorporation to risk of violations
Charter shopping. Where the ‘‘legal environment’’ becomes too restrictive, com-
panies may relocate to a more favourable jurisdiction, engaging in an economic
phenomenon known as ‘‘charter shopping’’.8 When private security and military
companies engage in charter shopping, this may contribute to the risk of an
international humanitarian law violation if their new state of incorporation is one
where ‘‘regulation is at best lax and often non-existent’’.9 There is anecdotal
evidence that charter shopping took place after South Africa adopted laws in 1998
which the private military and security company industry denounced as ‘‘over-
regulation’’ and ‘‘ungainly’’.10 Firms threaten that they ‘‘can become very nomadic
in order to evade nationally applied legislation which they regard as inappropriate
or excessive’’.11 However, this risk should not be overstated, because ‘‘companies
[which] choose to base themselves offshore in order to avoid scrutiny … pay a
price in terms of perceived lack of legitimacy’’.12
The weakness of extraterritorial jurisdiction schemes. With the notable exception
of the United States and South Africa, most states are reluctant to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over their private security and military companies.13
Even where laws authorize the extraterritorial regulation of national firms, there
are significant monitoring problems.14 Given that states of incorporation are
generally unwilling or unable to monitor the international humanitarian
law compliance of their private security and military companies (unless they are
also the clients of those firms), there is an enhanced risk that violations will
go undetected and unpunished, contributing to a sense of impunity that may
further increase the likelihood of international humanitarian law violations
recurring.
Privileging foreign policy interests. Private security and military companies may
be an important extension of the foreign policy of their states of incorporation.
8 See generally Jacob S. Ziegel et al., Cases and Materials on Partnerships and Canadian Business
Corporations, 3rd edn, Vol. I, Carswell, Toronto, 1994, pp. 248–51.
9 Ortiz, above note 7, p. 218.
10 Brooks, above note 1, p. 5. South Africa is considering stricter legislation that could heighten these
concerns: see Prohibition on Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities
in an Area of Armed Conflict Bill, 2005 (South Africa) (on file with author).
11 ‘‘Private military companies: Independent or regulated’’, Sandline International, 28 March 1998, p. 3,
online at ,http://www.sandline.com/white/regulation.doc. (visited 24 October 2006).
12 Henry Cummins, ‘‘Perception and profit: Understanding commercial military and security service
provision’’, Discussion Paper, Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy: University of Birmingham,
14 June 2002, p. 6; see also UK, Options for Regulation, above note 5, p. 21.
13 See generally, Ortiz, above note 7, pp. 217–218.
14 Ellen L. Frye, ‘‘Private military firms in the new world order: How redefining ‘‘mercenary’’ can tame the
‘‘dogs of war’’’’, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 73 (2005), p. 2647.
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For example, the United States Munitions List and International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, which also govern military service contracts, are ‘‘updated and
amended to reflect changing foreign policy goals’’.15 In the 1990s, these regulations
prohibited US-based private security and military companies from working for
certain parties in the former Yugoslavia, and in 2002 for the government of
Zimbabwe.16 The United Kingdom has stated that ‘‘it would retain reserve powers
to prevent [private security and military companies] from undertaking a contract
if it ran counter to UK interests or policy’’.17 Even without regulations in place,
some British private military and security companies have a ‘‘stated policy … to
consult the Government before entering into any contract with a foreign client’’.18
While both the United States and the United Kingdom have recognized
detailed human rights and international humanitarian law commitments
governing private military and security company activity in voluntary codes of
conduct, such as the UN Global Compact ‘‘Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights’’,19 such obligations are conspicuously absent in national
legislation. This strongly suggests that national regulation of the private military
and security company industry has very little to do with promoting compliance
with international humanitarian law; rather it is overwhelmingly concerned with
the foreign policy and national security interests of states in which such companies
are incorporated.
The incentives of states of incorporation to promote compliance
Reputational concerns and diplomatic repercussions. International legal com-
pliance literature postulates, among other things, that states ‘‘obey international
law when it serves their short- or long-term self-interest to do so’’.20 In this case,
states of incorporation will ‘‘ensure respect’’21 for international humanitarian law
when it is in the interests of their reputation to do so. There is strong evidence that
national regulatory activity is triggered by allegations of improper conduct by
private security and military companies abroad.
South Africa faced international pressure to control notorious firms based
there – notably Executive Outcomes – leading to the enactment of the Regulation
of Foreign Military Assistance Act 1998.22 Parliamentary consideration of private
15 Ortiz, above note 7, p. 213.
16 Ibid.
17 UK, Options for Regulation, above note 5, p. 25.
18 ‘‘We don’t operate in the shadows’’, Telegraph (United Kingdom), Issue 1632, 3 December 1999, online
at ,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/. (visited 24 October 2006).
19 See UN Global Compact, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, posted 24 June 1992,
online at ,http://www.unglobalcompact.org/. (visited 24 October 2006).
20 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘‘Transnational legal process’’, Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 75 (1996), p. 199; but
see Markus Burgstaller, Theories of Compliance with International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2005,
p. 157–65.
21 See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949 (First Geneva Convention), 75 UNTS 973, Art. 1, online at ,http://
www.icrc.org. (visited 24 October 2006).
22 Ortiz, above note 7, p. 215; Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (South Africa), No. 15 of 1998.
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military and security company regulation in the United Kingdom was spurred by
the ‘‘Arms to Africa’’ affair involving a former British colonel, Tim Spicer, of the
now defunct Sandline International, which had offices in London.23 In the United
States there has been a flurry of legislative activity in the wake of the prisoner
abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib, in which US contractors were implicated.24
Economic interest in the legitimacy of national private military and security com-
panies. Henry Cummins argues that states of incorporation have an economic
interest in fostering a perception that their private military and security companies
are legitimate.25 While it is true that many states of incorporation potentially
benefit from the tax revenues and the contribution to gross national product of
their said companies, the strength of this incentive should not be overstated. It is
also based on the assumption that ‘‘bad’’ private security and military companies
are unprofitable – an assumption that is challenged below.
States of personnel
Private military and security company personnel hail from an increasingly diverse
group of states. While most personnel were traditionally ex-military members
from developed countries, there is now a trend for private security and military
companies to hire former combatants from developing countries such as
Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Chile.26 In Iraq local
recruitment is increasing, with the effect that the ratio of expatriate to local staff
is 1:10. This has caused problems for firms such as Aegis Defense Systems, which
failed a recent US government audit that found that its Iraqi employees were
insufficiently vetted.27
The contribution of states of personnel to risk of violations
Monitoring problems and weak extraterritorial enforcement. As discussed in detail
above with respect to states of incorporation, states of personnel are even less
likely to be in a position to monitor geographically remote violations of
international humanitarian law by their nationals. Extraterritorial claims of
23 UK, Options for Regulation, above note 5, p. 6.
24 See, e.g., Contractor Accountability Act of 2004 (United States), HR 4387, 18 May 2004; MEJA
Clarification Act of 2004 (United States), 108th Congress, 2nd Sess., HR 4390, 19 May 2004;
Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2005 (United States), 109th Congress, 1st
Sess., S 209, 31 January 2005; International Security Enhancement Act of 2005 (United States), 109th
Congress, 1st Sess., HR 1361, 17 March 2005; Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting
Act (United States), 109th Congress, 1st Sess., 26 April 2005; Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, S 2400, 1 864, 865, 1021.
25 See Cummins, above note 12, p. 9.
26 Sonni Efron, ‘‘Troops for hire’’, Edmonton Journal, 2 August 2005, p. E11 (Proquest); see also Richard
Norton-Taylor, ‘‘Army fears loss of top troops to private firms’’, Guardian (United Kingdom), 8 August
2005, online at Corpwatch, ,http://www.corpwatch.org/. (visited 24 October 2006).
27 Tony Capaccio, ‘‘U.S. military tightens rules for contractors in combat zones’’, Bloomberg, 27 October
2005, online at IPOA, ,http://www.ipoaonline.org/. (visited 24 October 2006).
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jurisdiction solely on the basis of nationality of the offender remain relatively rare in
practice.
The incentives of states of personnel to promote compliance
Diplomatic repercussions. Throughout history and up to the present day, many
states have opted to impose prohibitions on their citizens engaging in military
activity abroad without the approval of the sovereign or state, reflecting foreign
policy concerns including the diplomatic repercussions of being perceived as
indirectly participating in a war.28 Most recently South Africa, for example, was
concerned that it was being seen as indirectly supporting the US-led war in Iraq,
as well as a coup plot in Equatorial Guinea, because significant numbers of its
nationals were allegedly working for private security and military companies in
those countries.29
However, the diplomatic incentives of states of personnel are likely to be
weaker than similar incentives of states of incorporation. This is due to the secrecy
within the industry, which means that the identities of private military and
security company personnel are usually kept in strict confidence.30
State of operation
Private security and military companies have a significant operational presence in
over fifty states around the world.31 The most high-profile incidents of private
military and security company activity since the end of the Cold War have taken
place in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Papua New Guinea,
Afghanistan and Iraq. Some states, such as Angola, actually required foreign
companies to ‘‘provide their own security by hiring PSCs’’.32 States where private
security and military companies are active have relatively strong incentives to curb
violations of international humanitarian law committed by these companies when
they act for non-state clients. However, this is limited to the extent to which the
28 See, e.g., A Proclamation Prohibiting His Majesties Subjects to Enter into the Service of Foreign Princes and
Lands, Sovereign, 1685–1688: James II, England and Wales, reproduced in Early English Books Online:
1641–1700, UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1999–2005, p. 962:5; Penal Code (Sweden), 1999:36, c. 18: s. 4,
online at Buffalo Criminal Law Center, ,http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/sweden.pdf. (visited
24 October 2006); Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (Australia), Act No. 13 of
1978 as amended to Act No. 104 of 2004, s. 6(1); Foreign Enlistment Act (Canada), R.S.C. 1985, c. F-28;
Shameem, above note 5, p. 7 (Namibian law).
29 Claude Voillat, ‘‘Private military companies: A word of caution’’, online at Humanitarian Practice
Network, ,http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID52675. (visited 24 October 2006); see also
‘‘Memorandum on the object of the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and
Regulation of Certain Activities in an Area of Armed Conflict Bill, 2005’’ (South Africa) (on file with
author).
30 See, e.g., CACI, ‘‘Employees in Iraq’’, 4 November 2004, online at ,http://www.caci.com/
iraq_faqs.shtml. (visited 24 October 2006).
31 Shameem, above note 5, p. 12.
32 Private Military Firms: Working Group on Private Military Companies, Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, 2004, p. 12.
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state of operation has full control over its territory – something that may be
doubtful during an armed conflict.
The contribution of states of operation to risk of violations
Loss of full control over national territory; insufficient resources for monitoring. The
risk of international humanitarian law violations by private security and military
companies in states of operation stems mainly from practical considerations resulting
from the very existence of an armed conflict. States of operation frequently lose
some measure of effective control over their national territory during an armed
conflict and have insufficient resources available to devote to monitoring private
security and military companies. For example, as an occupying power, and thus
effectively acting as the state of operation, only in the rarest cases has the US military
intervened to deal with allegations of improper private military and security company
behaviour. Indeed, when personnel from Zapata Engineering were detained in
Fallujah by US marines for allegedly shooting indiscriminately at civilians, this action
only took place when the soldiers actually witnessed the alleged violation firsthand.33
Likewise, in Afghanistan it was only after the United States as the state of operation
had regained almost full control over its territory that it appears to have begun to
investigate and prosecute private military and security company employees for
alleged violations.34
Additionally, private security and military companies that are hired by
opposing parties in the conflict are likely simply to be treated as ‘‘the enemy’’, and
will thus be ignored as an independent player with which to engage in a dialogue
concerning international humanitarian law compliance.
Incentives of states of operation to promote compliance
Protecting the political support base from violations. Political economy theory
suggests that government officials will respond to situations that could affect their
individual interests as politicians, such as their political base weakening or turning
against them.35 For example, empirical studies have found a direct correlation
between increases in defence spending and electoral cycles in states facing armed
conflict.36 States of operation therefore have an incentive to regulate private security
and military companies working in their territory, which is in line with their
obligations under international law ‘‘to ensure respect for IHL [international
33 ‘‘Army Chief notes ‘‘problematic’’ potential of armed contractors on the battlefield’’, Defense Daily
International, Vol. 6, Issue 35, 9 September 2005, p. 1 (Proquest).
34 In September 2004, three American private military company personnel were sentenced to 10 years’
imprisonment by an Afghan court for torture, running a private prison and illegal detention: Shameem,
above note 5, p. 14.
35 See, e.g., ‘‘Administrative & civil service reform’’, World Bank Group, online at ,http://
www1.worldbank.org/prem/acr/mainpage.html. (visited 24 October 2006).
36 Alex Mintz and Michael D. Ward, ‘‘Electoral cycles and defence spending in Israel: An analysis of
quarterly data’’, in Andrew L. Ross (ed.), The Political Economy of Defence: Issues and Perspectives,
Greenwood Press, New York, 1991, pp. 135–7, 150–1.
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humanitarian law] and exercise what’s known as ‘‘due diligence’’, by doing what’s
necessary to prevent and punish violations committed by individuals or entities
operating on or from their territory’’.37
In Papua New Guinea the activities of Sandline International became a
major election issue such that ‘‘every sitting Member of Parliament had to face this
criticism whether they were part of the Government or not’’.38 In Iraq, the
Coalition Provisional Authority responded to the proliferation of private security
and military companies by promulgating Coalition Provisional Authority
Memorandum No. 17, which, inter alia, requires all private security and military
companies, their officers and personnel to be ‘‘vetted’’ ‘‘to ensure that any
criminal or hostile elements are identified’’.39 Private security and military
companies risk forfeiture of a US$25,000 bond and the suspension or revocation
of their operating licence if there is a reasonable basis for believing that they have
violated applicable law.40 They may be permitted to continue operations if they
promptly terminate the employment of personnel who allegedly violated the law,
and co-operate with law enforcement officials.41
Clients
The clients of private security and military companies are quite diverse and
include states, non-state armed groups, corporations, non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), international organizations such as the United Nations, and
private individuals.42 Sandline International founder Tim Spicer ominously
admitted that ‘‘our clients may not be democratically elected in terms we all
understand in the West, but they are supported’’.43 Despite this diversity of clients,
there is some degree of similarity in the risks and incentives regarding the private
military and security companies that they hire.
Contribution of clients to risk of violations
‘‘Othering’’ perpetrators. Clients may hire private security and military companies
to undertake certain activities in order to distance themselves, politically or perhaps
even legally, from improper or unpopular activities by those companies they hire.44
37 ICRC, above note 4.
38 Aita Ivarato v. Peti Lafanama and Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea [1998] PGSC 27
(28 August, 1998) (Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea) (PacLII).
39 ‘‘Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 17: Registration Requirements for Private
Security Companies (PSC)’’ (Iraq), CPA/MEM/26 June 2004/17, 26 June 2004, s. 2(5).
40 Ibid., ss. 3(3), 4(2)(b).
41 Ibid., s. 4(2)(b).
42 Even the ICRC admits to hiring these firms, but ‘‘only in exceptional cases and exclusively for the
protection of premises’’. ICRC, above note 4.
43 Andrew Gilligan, ‘‘Inside Lt. Col. Spicer’s new model army’’, Telegraph (United Kingdom), Issue 1276,
22 November 1998, online at ,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/. (visited 24 October 2006).
44 For an example of political distancing generally, see Kevin A. O’Brien, ‘‘Leash the dogs of war’’, Financial
Times, 20 February 2002, online at Global Policy Forum,,http://www.globalpolicy.org. (United States
hiring DynCorp to conduct the Kosovo monitoring force) (visited 24 October 2006).
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Criminologists Ruth Jamieson and Kieran McEvoy argue that states attempt to
‘‘obfuscate their responsibility in state crime through ‘‘othering’’ both perpetrators
and victims’’,45 including ‘‘the use of private-sector mercenaries and military firms
to outsource state deviance’’.46 Political scientist Peter Singer agrees that a key risk of
private security and military companies is that they ‘‘allow governments to carry out
actions that would not otherwise be possible, such as those that would not gain
legislative or public approval’’.47 State crime may be circumscribed by media
exposure, but criminologists caution that the power of this control is variable,
depending on the ideological alignment of media outlets and their access to or
ability to discover violations.48 This combination of reliance on private security and
military companies to ‘‘do the dirty work’’ and removal of democratic oversight is a
troubling prospect that increases the risk of a violation of international
humanitarian law.
It has also been suggested that ‘‘the large rewards offered for the capture
of Al-Qaida members in Afghanistan have contributed to the expansion of private
security activity in the country’’.49 This ‘‘reward’’ approach further distances the
United States from allegations of alleged wrongdoing, since there is no direct
relationship between these enterprising private security and military companies
and the US government.
Market demand for ‘‘aggressive’’ or ‘‘disreputable’’ services. Economic theory
suggests that market demand for a particular service will result in the emergence
of a supplier willing to offer its services if it is profitable to do so. Even private
security and military companies themselves have admitted that ‘‘the commercial
reward being offered by a particular prospective client may simply be too great
for the company to ignore, or perhaps the company is a maverick and more
interested in working for unrecognised rebel groups rather than legitimate
governments.’’50
Deborah Avant has observed an increasingly strong pattern in the US
hiring of private security and military companies to select so-called ‘‘cowboy’’
firms – those which take a more aggressive posture in the field. The consequence is
that ‘‘the more the US chooses cowboy firms the more it is likely to influence a
change in the norms that govern PSCs’’.51 In a more nuanced example, ‘‘MPRI [a
US private security company] employees admitted that it was sometimes tough to
45 Ruth Jamieson and Kieran McEvoy, ‘‘State crime by proxy and juridical othering’’, British Journal of
Criminology, Vol. 45 (2005), p. 504.
46 Ibid.
47 P. W. Singer, ‘‘Outsourcing war’’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, Issue 2 (2005), p. 119 (Proquest).
48 Jeffrey Ian Ross, ‘‘The future of controlling state crime: Where do we go from here?’’, in Jeffrey Ian Ross
(ed.), Controlling State Crime, 2nd edn, Transaction Publishers, London, 2000, p. 423; see also ‘‘Media
complicity in a ‘‘fine little war’’’’, in Christina Jacqueline Johns and P. Ward Johnson (eds.), State Crime,
the Media, and the Invasion of Panama, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1994, p. 63
49 Shameem, above note 5, p. 14.
50 Sandline, above note 11, p. 2.
51 Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 228.
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walk the line between advocating strict and clear adherence to the laws of war and
developing a mutual understanding with the personnel they were training so as to
better influence their judgments and behaviour in the future’’.52 Other
implications of this phenomenon at the individual private military and security
company level are discussed in detail later.
Poor contract administration. Management studies have shown that poor contract
management and administration is a systematic problem, given that it is a ‘‘manual,
time-consuming process’’ and because contract data are a mix of qualitative
and quantitative findings that are not easily amalgamated for tracking and
synthesis.53 This is an especially serious problem, given that the ‘‘monitoring and
sanctioning capacity of consumers’’ has been recognized as an important aspect of
establishing client control over private military and security company activity,54 but
such management and oversight are frequently non-existent in practice.55
Management studies have also shown that most service failures stem from
misunderstanding by the customer as to how the service delivery process is to take
place.56 This is apparent in the Fay Report into prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, which
found that US soldiers ‘‘never received any parameters or guidance as to how the
CACI [a US private military company] personnel were to be utilized’’, and they were
‘‘never informed that the Government could reject unsatisfactory CACI
employees’’.57
Criminal liability of clients difficult to establish. In many national jurisdictions,
there are legal barriers to holding corporate clients criminally liable for the
conduct of the private security and military companies they hire,58 and these may
add to the risk of an international humanitarian law violation occurring. A
provision at the international level that would have allowed the International
Criminal Court to have jurisdiction over corporate entities was notably rejected
during negotiations.59
52 Ibid., p. 224.
53 Ashif Mawji, ‘‘Compliant or competitive: How about both?’’, Contract Management, Vol. 45, Issue 8
(2005), p. 38, figure 1 (Proquest). For best practices in contract administration, see Gregory A. Garrett
et al., ‘‘Managing contracts in turbulent times: The contract management maturity model’’, Contract
Management, Vol. 45, Issue 9 (2005), p. 48 (Proquest).
54 Avant, above note 51, p. 220.
55 Singer, above note 47.
56 Anders Gustafsson and Michael D. Johnson, Competing in a Service Economy: How to Create a
Competitive Advantage through Service Development and Innovation, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2003,
p. 50.
57 Major-General George R. Fay, AR 15–6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th
Military Intelligence Brigade (Fay Report), August 2004, p. 50, online at United States Department of
Defense, ,http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040825fay.pdf. (CACI was the firm hired to
provide contractor interrogators at Abu Ghraib) (visited 24 October 2006).
58 ICRC, above note 4.
59 Rebecca Bratspies, ‘‘‘‘Organs of society’’: A plea for human rights accountability for transnational
enterprises and other business entities’’, Michigan State Journal of International Law, Vol. 13 (2005),
pp. 25–7.
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Incentives of clients to promote compliance
State responsibility for state clients. The international law of state responsibility
offers a limited counterbalance to the risk of ‘‘othering’’ discussed above. Under
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, a
client state could incur international responsibility for violations of international
humanitarian law committed by its private military and security companies if that
firm was (a) empowered by law to exercise governmental authority; (b) acting on
the instructions of, or under direction and control of, that state; or (c) exercising
de facto governmental authority in absence/default of governmental officials.60
Nevertheless, state responsibility remains a largely theoretical exercise that has
only been infrequently invoked in practice. It is also significant that the US
Department of Defense recently adopted regulations on private military and
security company contractors which could have the effect of limiting some aspects
of state responsibility of the United States for international humanitarian law
violations committed by their contractors. These instructions specify that
‘‘functions and duties that are inherently governmental are barred from private
sector performance.’’61
Market demand for ‘‘reputable’’ services. A key distinction must be made
between clients who hire private security and military companies with the
expectation – as a purpose or contingency – that they may fail to fully respect
international humanitarian law (as discussed above), and those who demand
strict adherence to international humanitarian law norms. Some private security
and military companies recognize that many clients have an interest in hiring
firms that are ‘‘internationally acceptable’’, and for this reason they favour a
regime of certification.62 Clients that demand ‘‘reputable’’ private security and
military companies’ services may enhance compliance with international
humanitarian law more generally throughout the market. So-called ‘‘blue chip’’
clients, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), have extremely strong incentives to only hire private military and
security companies with a spotless record of international humanitarian
law compliance. However, the market power of these international
organizations is by no means predominant. The consequences of a market
split between consumer demand for ‘‘disreputable’’ and ‘‘reputable’’ private
military and security company services may be significant:
60 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, adopted at 53rd Sess., November 2001, Arts. 5, 8, 9, online at ILC, ,http://www.un.org/law/ilc/.
(visited 24 October 2006). See also ICRC, above note 4; and see Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986 (for
‘‘effective control’’ test).
61 US Department of Defense, Instruction No. 3020.41: Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the
U.S. Armed Forces, 3 October 2005, s. 6.1.5 (emphasis added).
62 Sandline International, above note 11, p. 3.
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Those who pay are both states and non state actors – to what degree will these
different types of consumers come to agreement about what constitutes
legitimate behavior or legitimate authorization? If they do not, competing
norms should weaken the hold of any norm on behavior.63
Client interest in proper service delivery and contractual protections. Clients
have a general economic and legal interest in obtaining what they contracted for –
no more and no less. They accordingly have an incentive to ensure the proper
delivery of private military and security company services, in the course of which
international humanitarian law violations (where they are unanticipated)
constitute a breach of the terms of service. An activist approach by ‘‘reputable’’
clients would see them demanding contractual mechanisms to monitor and punish
violations of international humanitarian law by the private security and military
companies they hire. According to the International Peace Operations Association
(IPOA), a US-based industry association of private military and security
companies, ‘‘contractual obligations can be much more specific and invasive
than general guidelines and regulations. They could include military observers,
increased transparency and detailed financial and legal penalties for
noncompliance’’.64
For example, the US Department of Defense’s contract with Titan Inc.
to provide interrogation linguists at Abu Ghraib included a clause ‘‘that allows
the Contracting Officer to direct the contractor to remove linguists from the
theatre in which they are performing. This clause has been invoked on occasion
for misconduct.’’65 But the limitations on any client’s ability to properly manage
a contract must be borne in mind, as discussed above. It has also been argued
that ‘‘in general, market mechanisms are blunt tools and markets offer fewer
pathways for consumers to explain their choices than hierarchies offer to
superiors.’’66
Civil liability of clients. International legal scholars have pointed out that com-
panies may be held civilly liable under the US Alien Tort Claims Act67 for grave
breaches of international humanitarian law.68 Some have argued that there is a
basis in existing case-law for corporate clients to be liable for international
humanitarian law violations if there is a ‘‘substantial degree of cooperation’’
63 Deborah Avant, ‘‘Market allocation of force and the prospects for global security professionals’’,
Conference ‘‘Beyond Terror: A New Security Agenda’’, 3–4 June 2005, online at Watson Institute for
International Studies, ,http://www.watsoninstitute.org/gs/beyondterror/avant.htm. (emphasis
added).
64 Brooks, above note 1, p. 4.
65 Fay Report, above note 57, p. 48.
66 Avant, above note 51, p. 220.
67 Alien Tort Claims Act (United States), 28 USC 11350.
68 Gregory G. A. Tzeutschler, ‘‘Corporate violator: The alien tort liability of transnational corporations for
human rights abuses abroad’’, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 30 (1999), pp. 411–12.
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between them and the private security and military companies they hire.69
However, there has yet to be a case of a corporation being held liable under the
Alien Tort Claims Act for the violations of a private military and security company
that it has hired; it is an enactment that has been narrowed in scope in recent
jurisprudence, continues to have significant jurisdictional hurdles to overcome in
many cases, and is not replicated in other jurisdictions.70 The limited possibility of
civil liability of corporate clients for private military and security company
violations committed abroad therefore remains a relatively weak compliance
incentive at this point in time.
The private military and security company industry
Through the lens of corporate strategy, the private military and security company
industry would view its principal incumbent competitor as being public national
armed forces. This realization brings with it both risks and incentives for
compliance with international humanitarian law.
The contribution of the industry to risk of violations
Certain interests are not conducive to observance of international humanitarian
law. One of the main ‘‘competitive advantages’’ of private security and military
companies vis-a`-vis national armed forces is the ability of the former to deploy
quickly and project force rapidly. Claude Voillat of the ICRC has warned that this
‘‘pressure for profitability [is] not conducive to the solid integration of
international humanitarian law into their business practices’’.71 These concerns
are consistent with the risk identified in the sociology literature that ‘‘[e]conomic
success, competition for scarce resources, and norm erosion’’72 may generate
unlawful behaviour by organizations on a systematic basis.
Blanket denials of international humanitarian law violations. The private mili-
tary and security company industry’s interest in being perceived as legitimate can
increase the risk of international humanitarian law violations occurring if it leads
the industry to issue blanket denials that any such violations have taken place. For
its part, the IPOA denies that violations of human rights or international
humanitarian law are widespread, arguing that ‘‘the majority of fears articulated
by critics exist only as academic theory’’.73 Sandline International, while it was
69 Tina Garmon, ‘‘Domesticating international corporate responsibility: Holding private military firms
accountable under the Alien Tort Claims Act’’, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law,
Vol. 11 (2003), p. 353.
70 See Business and International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave Violations of
International Law, International Peace Academy and Fafo, Allkopi Sarpsborg, Norway, 2002, pp. 14–15.
71 Voillat, above note 29.
72 Diane Vaughan, Controlling Unlawful Organizational Behavior: Social Structure and Corporate
Misconduct, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983, p. 62.
73 Brooks, above note 1, p. 4.
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operating, chalked up claims of violations that it was alleged to have committed to
propaganda by its clients’ military opponents.74 Similarly, despite reports
implicating its personnel in potential violations of international humanitarian
law at Abu Ghraib, CACI continues to deny any impropriety.75
An inability of the private military and security company industry to
recognize the problem of violations is in itself a serious cause for concern. Issuing
denials that violations are occurring is one thing – but making public the findings
of investigations and prosecuting known offenders is another.
Incentives for the industry to promote compliance
Acceptance of industry’s legitimacy. Private security and military companies ‘‘are
eager to present themselves as respectable bodies with a natural niche in the often
complicated post-Cold War world order’’.76 If the private military and security
company industry is to become a sustainable competitor to national armed forces,
corporate strategy suggests that it must gain acceptance and legitimacy for
respecting international humanitarian law. Henry Cummins describes legitimacy
in this context as ‘‘moral advantage’’ based on ‘‘[r]eputation, transparency,
history, [and] ethical conduct’’.77 The industry therefore has a powerful incentive
to identify and ‘‘blacklist’’ firms within its midst that violate international
humanitarian law.
Although this incentive has yet to manifest itself fully in practice, it is a
realistic possibility. Many leading private security and military companies,
particularly US firms, are members of the IPOA, which in 2005 adopted a Code
of Conduct written largely by NGOs,78 in which its members agreed to respect
international humanitarian law:
In all their operations, Signatories will respect the dignity of all human beings
and strictly adhere to all relevant international laws and protocols on human
rights. They will take every practicable measure to minimize loss of life and
destruction of property. Signatories agree to follow all rules of international
humanitarian law and human rights law that are applicable as well as all relevant
international protocols and conventions, including but not limited to:
N Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
N Geneva Conventions (1949)
N Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions (1977)
N Protocol on the Use of Toxic and Chemical Weapons (1979)
N Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2000)
74 Sandline International, above note 11, p. 3.
75 CACI, above note 30.
76 Gilligan, above note 43.
77 Cummins, above note 12, p. 5.
78 Brooks, above note 1, p. 4.
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… While minor infractions should be proactively addressed by companies
themselves, Signatories pledge, to the extent possible and subject to
contractual and legal limitations, to fully cooperate with official investigations
into allegations of contractual violations and violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law.79
While no formal complaints have been made public by the IPOA, failure
to respect the code of conduct may result in sanctions, including expulsion from
the association. The IPOA has also created a standards committee that is charged
with revising and enforcing the said code.80 The viability of this emerging model is
considered in more detail in the Conclusion below.
Incumbent firms have greater interest in the industry’s good reputation. Long-
standing or incumbent private military and security companies have a greater
interest in protecting the reputation of the industry as a whole than do new
entrants or upstarts,81 because they have invested more in their brand equity. For
example, the 24-year-old ArmorGroup, with headquarters in the United Kingdom,
has stated, ‘‘It is also worrying that some companies are calling for immunity
(from prosecution) in Iraq. We don’t want immunity and we don’t need it. We
always go about our business within the laws of the countries where we work.’’82
This suggests that speaking of a homogeneous ‘‘private military and security
company industry’’ may be a simplification in view of the diversity of firms that
constitute it. It is this diversity at the level of individual firms that is considered
next.
Individual private military and security companies
Jeff Herbst has ‘‘predicted that a distinction would emerge between upscale firms
(that appeal to the United Nations, INGOs and other upstanding members of the
international community by virtue of their willingness to abide by international
law) and downscale firms (that appeal to non-lawful elements)’’.83 Economic
theory and corporate strategy, as well as practice, indicate that the private military
and security company industry is maturing and that the market segmentation
predicted by Herbst is thus beginning to take place at the individual firm level.
Market segmentation is characterized by firms adapting or marketing their
products or services to specific target groups of consumers. A firm is able to
enhance its profitability by tailoring its offerings more closely to the preferences of
particular types of customers; as a result, a brand or market reputation becomes
79 IPOA Code of Conduct, IPOA, 31 March 2005, online at ,http://www.ipoaonline.org/en/standards/
code.htm. (visited 24 October 2006).
80 IPOA, ‘‘Committees’’, online at ,http://www.ipoaonline.org/. (visited 24 October 2006).
81 Voillat, above note 29.
82 Keilthy, above note 3.
83 Avant, above note 51, p. 221, referring to Jeffrey Herbst, ‘‘The regulation of private security firms’’, in
Greg Mills and John Stremlau (eds.), The Privatization of Security in Africa, SAIIA Press, Johannesburg,
1999, pp. 122–5.
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associated with the firm itself or the individuals running it.84 With regard to
individual private military and security companies this realization carries both
incentives for compliance and risks of non-compliance with international
humanitarian law.
The contribution by individual companies to risk of violations
Market segmentation – ‘‘aggressive’’ or ‘‘bad’’ firms. One of the most significant
risks to international humanitarian law is posed by private military and security
companies that profit from their ‘‘bad’’ reputations in a segmented market.
Certain clients may seek out firms that are willing to be more ‘‘aggressive’’ in their
interpretation of international humanitarian law or even to violate it for a price.85
Certain members of the private military and security company industry have
recognized that some firms are attractive, in part, precisely because they are
outside formal state armed forces, ‘‘far less trained, far less accountable, and
already tainted, albeit slightly, with a whiff of dirty tricks’’.86
By hiring these ‘‘bad’’ firms, clients may perceive a benefit in signalling
that their posture is more aggressive in a given armed conflict or post-conflict
environment, as the United States has done in private military and security
company procurement in Iraq, prompted by the growing insurgency. This
phenomenon is reflected in the decision to hire Aegis Defence Services, founded by
Tim Spicer (founder of the now defunct Sandline International), to conduct
‘‘mobile vehicle warfare’’ as well as ‘‘counter-snipping’’. Commentators have
speculated that Spicer’s ‘‘history and record of taking on dicey tasks may have led
him to be more attractive than the companies that play more strictly by the rules’’.87
Indeed, given the prospect of private military and security companies rebranding
or reincorporating, it appears that the main way in which brand differentiation
and market segmentation is taking place in this industry is through the identity of
the officers or directors of these firms (such as Col. Spicer).
Competition, declining quality of personnel, costs of vetting. Increased demand
for private military and security company services as a result of the armed conflicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq has given rise to ‘‘[i]ntense competition [that] has driven
down prices for security services. Political uncertainty and the escalation of
violence have hampered reconstruction, delayed contracts and increased costs’’.88
This has caused some corporations to cut corners in their screening procedures.
84 See Malcolm McDonald and Ian Dunbar, Market Segmentation, Macmillan Business, London, 1995,
pp. 15–16.
85 This would be a negative form of ‘‘benefit segmentation’’, whereby consumers select a given service/
product on the basis of the perceived benefits that it confers on them. See J. Paul Peter and Jerry
C. Olson, Consumer Behavior and Marketing Strategy, 7th edn, McGraw-Hill Irwin, Boston, 2005,
pp. 383–4.
86 Avant, above note 51, p. 227.
87 Ibid., pp. 226–7 (emphasis added).
88 James Boxell, ‘‘Competition hits security groups in Iraq’’, Financial Times (United Kingdom),
5 November 2005, p. 16.
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For example, U.S. Army investigators of the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal
found that ‘‘approximately 35 percent of the contract interrogators lacked formal
military training as interrogators’’. In other cases, investigations of contractors
serving in Iraq revealed the hiring of a former British Army soldier who had been
jailed for working with Irish terrorists, and a former South African soldier who
had admitted to firebombing the houses of more than 60 political activists during
the apartheid era.89
However, other commentators argue that ‘‘[a]s competition intensifies,
brand advantage becomes more significant, and the battle for solid market share
begins in earnest’’.90
Incentives for individual companies to promote compliance
Market segmentation – ‘‘good’’ firms. Management literature indicates that cor-
porate reputations are built on perception as opposed to facts, and a good
corporate reputation may offer a competitive advantage in terms of ‘‘social
credibility’’.91 The positive side of market segmentation, from an international
humanitarian law point of view, is that certain firms will seek to build their
business model around an excellent reputation for international humanitarian law
compliance.92 These firms must maintain their reputation or risk losing contracts
and corporate opportunities.93 For example, ‘‘Titan’s long anticipated sale to
Lockheed Martin imploded, due at least partly to its alleged involvement in the
Iraqi prison scandal [at Abu Ghraib].’’94 However, a problem in linking violations
of international humanitarian law to particular private military and security
companies arises because their employees are transient, sometimes working for
several firms, with the result that ‘‘this complicates the development of corporate
reputation as a link to accountability or control by clouding the information
available.’’95 An enhanced flow of information could increase the extent to which
clients can optimize their purchasing decisions.96
Reducing legal uncertainty. Private military and security companies operate in
volatile security environments that frequently involve high degrees of legal
89 Singer, above note 47.
90 Cummins, above note 12, p. 8.
91 Arlo Kristjan O. Brady, The Sustainability Effect: Rethinking Corporate Reputation in the 21st Century,
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, pp. 64–5.
92 See, e.g., Avant, above note 51, p. 221.
93 See Kevin T. Jackson, Building Reputational Capital: Strategies for Integrity and Fair Play that Improve the
Bottom Line, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 178–80; Joe Marconi, Reputation Marketing:
Building and Sustaining Your Organization’s Greatest Asset, McGraw-Hill, Chicago, 2002, pp. 13–19.
94 ‘‘Still, Titan does not seem to have been cut out of the U.S. DoD procurement loop’’. David Isenberg, ‘‘A
Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq’’,
British American Security Information Council, Research Report 2004.4, September 2004, p. 52, online
at ,http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC.pdf. (visited 24 October, 2006).
95 Avant, above note 51, p. 222.
96 Ibid., p. 221.
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uncertainty as to the status of their personnel and legitimacy of their activities.
It is in the interest of individual private military and security companies to
clarify the existing regulations and rules that govern them.97 For example,
incidents like the detention of personnel of the UK-based Logo Logistics Ltd in
Zimbabwe on 7 March 2004 on suspicion of mercenary activity would have
been a significant business disruption if we believe Logo officials’ statements
that their team was not deploying to participate in a coup d’e´tat but was, in
fact, headed for the Democratic Republic of Congo to assist a mining company
with its security.98
The possibility of civil and criminal liability. Liability of private military and
security companies as corporate entities for violations of international
humanitarian law offers a theoretical incentive for them to respect those
norms. However, the strength of this incentive is highly variable, depending on
the jurisdiction(s) in question. According to the ICRC, civil liability for private
military and security companies is ‘‘generally accepted’’ if these firms commit
violations of international humanitarian law, although their criminal liability ‘‘is
[very] limited in most countries’’.99 At any rate, finding a viable forum may be
difficult. Courts in a conflict or post-conflict zone are unlikely to be fully
operative, and very few states of incorporation are willing to reach out
extraterritorially to regulate the conduct of their private military and security
companies abroad.100 In practice, it has been difficult, outside a few high-profile
cases, to establish and secure the civil liability of companies for grave violations
of international humanitarian law.101 Hence it is not surprising that, in global
terms, the ‘‘the protection scheme cobbled together from these poor tools is
hopelessly inadequate’’.102
Employees of private military and security companies
As discussed above in the ‘‘States of personnel’’ section, private military and
security company employees hail from an increasingly diverse set of countries.
Sociology and psychology studies such as the Roots of Behaviour in War103 project
conducted by the ICRC may be extrapolated to demonstrate that private mili-
tary and security company personnel present a greater inherent risk from an
97 Capaccio, above note 27.
98 Frye, above note 14, p. 2607.
99 ICRC, above note 4.
100 Ibid.
101 See Fafo, above note 70, pp. 13–15. Indeed, Al Rawi v. Titan Corporation, which is a class action claim in
the US District Court for the Southern District of California, appears to be the first civil claim alleging
violations of international humanitarian law by a private military and security company – in this case
concerning the Abu Ghraib scandal. Al Rawi et al. v. Titan Corporation et al., Complaint of Plaintiffs,
9 June 2004 (U.S. Dist. Ct. – S. CA) (Findlaw).
102 Bratspies, above note 59, p. 28; but see Garmon, above note 69.
103 The Roots of Behaviour in War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations, ICRC, Geneva, 2004.
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international humanitarian law perspective than members of national armed
forces.
The contribution of private military and security company employees to risk of
violations
Non-membership of permanent military hierarchies and sense of impunity. One of
the main findings of the Roots of Behaviour in War study is that the behaviour of
combatants is determined, in part, by their role in a group which demands adherence
to norms, and their place in a hierarchical structure which can impose sanctions for
violations of those norms.104 Ted Itani, Humanitarian Issues Advisor to the Canadian
Red Cross, explained further that a ‘‘sense of impunity from accountability or
prosecution’’ and an ‘‘absence of discipline’’ are two factors explaining breaches of
international humanitarian law by individuals in armed conflict.105 Most disturbingly,
none of the private military and security company personnel implicated in the Abu
Ghraib violations has yet had to face criminal charges, despite the fact that some US
soldiers have meanwhile been held accountable.106 Such a situation contributes to a
sense of impunity that increases the risk of an international humanitarian law
violation. This risk is compounded by the secrecy of the private military and security
company industry and the international mobility of their employees.
Variable degree of training in international humanitarian law. Insufficient inte-
gration of international humanitarian law into all aspects of military operations
raises the risk of a violation taking place.107 Claude Voillat of the ICRC has
recognized that ‘‘another cause for concern is the poor training in international
humanitarian law that some of these private actors receive, if they are trained at
all.’’108 Interestingly, the US Department of Defense recently unveiled new
requirements, based in part on post-Abu Ghraib recommendations, for a sub-
category of private military and security company contractors termed
‘‘Contractors Deploying with the Force’’. These individuals are subject to more
rigorous vetting, and prior to deployment they must ‘‘validate or complete any
required training (e.g.; Geneva Conventions; law of armed conflict; …)’’.109
Incentives of private military and security company employees to promote
compliance
International labour market. Economic theory suggests that in labour markets
characterized by repeated interactions between employers and employees (as in
104 Ibid., p. 15.
105 Remarks of Ted Itani, Canadian Red Cross Conference on Customary International Humanitarian Law,
McGill University, Montreal, 1 October 2005.
106 Capaccio, above note 27; see Taguba Report, above note 5, and CACI, above note 30.
107 ICRC, above note 103, pp. 15–16.
108 Voillat, above note 29.
109 US Department of Defense, above note 61, s. 6.2.7.1.
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the private military and security company industry where employees have been
observed to work for several firms, as discussed earlier), ‘‘norm-driven behaviour’’
plays an important role, even in competitive markets.110 According to Deborah
Avant, the market may ‘‘punish’’ private military and security company
employees who violate norms of international humanitarian law:
The career and network patterns among professionals in some parts of the
world suggest that this may be a more robust control mechanism than the
reputation of firms. Many individuals working for PSCs began their careers in
military service but have since moved back and forth between service to the
UN, service to PSCs, and service to INGOs … their future employment depends
on their reputation for professionalism, [and] they should be more likely to
behave according to professional norms.111
Criminal prosecution for violations. Criminal prosecution of private military and
security company employees for violations of international humanitarian law is theo-
retically possible, but such prosecutions are very unlikely in actual fact. Assertions of
universal jurisdiction against them for violations of that nature are rare in practice.
Under US law, which takes an aggressive approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction
concerning private military and security company employees, significant gaps still
arise in practice. In the United States v. Passaro, the accused, a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) contractor, could not be charged under the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act because it only confers jurisdiction on contractors of the
Department of Defense.112 Instead, he was charged under US Code, Title 18,
Section 7(9)(A), which was applicable only because the incidents of abuse allegedly
took place at a US military base.113 Nor will all violations of international humani-
tarian law necessarily incur individual criminal responsibility under international
law; typically only violations which are ‘‘serious’’ in nature or are ‘‘grave breaches’’ of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions or 1977 Additional Protocols may be prosecuted.
Conclusion
Through the preceding multidisciplinary investigation of each level of private
military and security company activity, several important insights emerge. First,
110 Simon Ga¨chter and Armin Falk, ‘‘Reputation and reciprocity: Consequence for labour relations’’,
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, Issue 1 (2002), pp. 1, 15.
111 Avant, above note 51, p. 223 (emphasis added); the applicability of this argument across local and
expatriate personnel remains to be seen.
112 Passaro, above note 5; Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (United States), 106th Congress,
Public Law 106–523, 22 November 2000; see also MEJA Clarification Act of 2004 (United States), 108th
Congress, 2nd Sess., HR 4390, 19 May 2004.
113 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘QandA: Private military contractors and the law: States have an obligation to
prosecute perpetrators of war crimes in their courts’’, 21 October 2004, online at Global Policy Forum,
,http://www.globalpolicy.org/. (visited 24 October 2006). Notably, with reference to Iraq: ‘‘Many of
the contractors working in Iraq worked for companies that had contracts not with the Defense
Department, but with the Department of the Interior’’ (ibid.).
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and most importantly, a deeper and more nuanced understanding of this modern
phenomenon has been made possible. This stands in stark contrast to the sweeping
generalizations often made by special interest groups in the private military and
security company debate, which contribute little to appreciating the theoretical
compliance risks and incentives such companies present from an international
humanitarian law perspective.
Second, these findings may serve to help formulate a proactive agenda for
reform, to improve international humanitarian law compliance by private military
and security companies by maximizing incentives and mitigating risks identified
above. This agenda should be informed by the fact that many of the most powerful
risks and incentives with regard to such compliance have been shown to be
grounded in behaviour and norms which fall outside formal law. If we are truly
interested in promoting compliance with international humanitarian law by these
pervasive non-state entities in modern armed conflict, we would be well advised to
consider emergent approaches which similarly operate outside formal law,
particularly in view of the disagreement within the international community on
how to cope with private military and security company activity. Two initiatives
which deserve greater support and development in this respect are the compliance
mechanisms in the 2005 Code of Conduct of the IPOA,114 and the initiative of the
ICRC, which began in late 2004.115
The IPOA Code of Conduct, discussed in detail earlier, is premised on the
strong incentive of the private military and security company industry to be
perceived as legitimate, to ‘‘blacklist’’ violators of international humanitarian
law in their midst and to marginalize firms that seek to profit from a ‘‘bad’’
reputation. While codes of conduct ‘‘can be important in setting expectations and
norms within which the market works’’,116 it is unclear as yet whether the IPOA
will consider it to be in the interests of the industry to discipline violating
members. There is of course the problem that in ruling on whether to expel a
member, the association would find itself in a conflict of interest. First, while it
could be in the industry’s best interest to expel a violating member, the association
could be concerned that the expulsion of members could deter new members from
signing up for fear of being similarly expelled. Second, there is a risk that the
association’s board, which is composed exclusively of private military and security
company executives, may be more rigorous in sanctioning their competitors than
their own companies.
These problems in the industry’s compliance mechanism can be mitigated
to enhance the potential normative pull of the IPOA Code of Conduct. First,
outside directors should be added to the board to manage the potential conflicts of
interest discussed above. This is also a prudent measure for corporate governance
more generally. Second, and more importantly, a graduated scale of remedial
measures should be announced by the IPOA to promote private military and
114 IPOA Code of Conduct, above note 79.
115 ICRC, above note 4.
116 Avant, above note 51, p. 220.
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security company compliance with international humanitarian law when an
alleged violation occurs. These could include the following possible steps for the
association to take: issuing an order for the impugned member to co-operate with
public authorities in investigations and to implement appropriate internal
disciplinary measures; imposing a confidential written sanction on the member;
imposing a public written sanction on the member; ordering the impugned
member to issue a private or public apology; requiring the member to pay a fine to
the association or make a charitable contribution to an international humanitarian
organization; overseeing the payment of restitution to identifiable victims of the
member’s wrongful conduct; requiring the member to establish more effective
internal policies and procedures; mandating enhanced training in international
humanitarian law for employees as well as officers and directors of the impugned
member; requiring the member to monitor its operations for compliance with
international humanitarian law and to report back to the association at regular
intervals; for repeated or very serious violations, temporally suspending the
member; and, in extreme cases, expelling the member from the association.117
These recommendations could be adopted by the IPOA and the newly created
British Association of Private Security Companies(launched in January 2006),118 to
accentuate the strong incentives for the industry to be perceived as legitimate
through compliance, and to reduce the serious risk of individual firms benefiting
from an ‘‘aggressive’’ or ‘‘bad’’ reputation.
Another initiative that warrants attention began in August 2004 when the
ICRC announced its intention to set up a systematic programme to engage private
military and security companies in a dialogue in order to promote their
compliance with international humanitarian law.119 This new initiative has the
purpose of:
(i) informing private military and security companies of their
obligations under international humanitarian law;
(ii) ensuring ‘‘transparent accountability processes exist to prevent and
punish violations of these provisions’’;120
(iii) encouraging private military and security companies to incorporate
international humanitarian law into the training and military
advice they offer to clients; and
(iv) ensuring that private military and security companies do not
inhibit ICRC access to victims of armed conflict.121
117 Many of these measures exist under national criminal law for corporate wrongdoing in Canada. See, e.g.,
Criminal Code (Canada), R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 732.1(3.1).
118 Peter Almond, ‘‘UK: War’s fertile grounds for soldiers of fortune’’, Sunday Times (United Kingdom),
30 October 2005, online at Corpwatch, ,http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id512711. (visited
24 October 2006); ‘‘Andy Bearpark’’, Intelligence Online No. 511, 9 November 2005, online at ,http://
www.intelligenceonline.com/. (visited 24 October 2006).
119 Until now, contact between the ICRC and private military and security companies has been on an
‘‘informal basis’’. ICRC, above note 4.
120 Voillat, above note 29.
121 ICRC, above note 4.
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Given the size of the industry, the ICRC’s programme focuses on private
military and security companies that are active in ‘‘conflict situations’’ or engaged
in training and advising armed forces, their state of incorporation and their
clients;122 it is thus based on a ‘‘triangular strategy’’.123 Before this approach was
adopted, ‘‘there has been little or no engagement between [private military and
security companies] and other stakeholders’’.124
The ICRC’s initiative is an admirable effort addressed to at least three of
the main players in private military and security company activity. It has the
potential to align several strong incentives promoting compliance with interna-
tional humanitarian law, including the motivations of individual firms that seek to
profit from a ‘‘good’’ reputation for respecting international humanitarian law,
the reputational and economic interests of states of incorporation, and clients’
interest in proper service delivery. However, the ICRC programme would benefit
from a more explicit and direct involvement of industry associations, in view of
the role they may play as potential ‘‘sites of normativity’’ within the sector as a
whole. Further, industry associations operate across armed conflicts, which has the
benefit of ensuring that sustainable progress is made in instilling respect for
international humanitarian law in the private military and security company
sector. In addition, the ICRC should be careful not to fall into the same trap as the
UN Global Compact, which has been very reluctant to include private military and
security companies in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,125
‘‘fearing that they will use the VPs as a way to garner new business’’.126 One of the
most powerful incentives for such a company to comply with international
humanitarian law is, as shown above, the resulting enhancement of its corporate
reputation. The desire to be of good standing is conducive to this progressive
acceptance of norms, as are meetings with the ICRC. While this contact will be
troubling to some, it is consistent with the ICRC’s pragmatic approach to
promoting compliance with international humanitarian law, and offers a more
realistic prospect of doing so than the prevailing attitude towards private
military and security companies, which ranges from ignoring them to unabashedly
castigating them.
As with any multidisciplinary analysis, constructive criticism and
refinement of the risks and incentives that have been identified in this article by
experts in their respective fields should be welcomed. A collaborative development
in our appreciation of the complexity of private military and security company
activity will foster better understanding of the role of those companies in modern
armed conflict, and provide valuable lessons for initiatives designed to promote
compliance by these non-state entities with international humanitarian law.
122 Ibid.
123 Isenberg, above note 94, p. 66.
124 Cummins, above note 12, p. 2.
125 Voluntary Principles, above note 19.
126 Karen Ballentine, ‘‘Consolidation of the GC policy dialogue on the role of the private sector in zones of
conflict: Identifying public policy options to promote conflict-sensitive business practices’’, 7–8 October
2004, p. 8, online at United Nations, ,http://www.unglobalcompact.org. (visited 24 October 2006).
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